Needless to
say, this turn of events was surprising and extremely disappointing because the
athletic and technical sides of the team had grown to be truly formidable.
The
record shows the caliber of the names involved. Perhaps more importantly in
such a collaborative undertaking, promising constructive relationships were growing
within the group.
The sailing and shore teams had already fitted out and
assembled their first race boat at the regatta venue after completing a
training camp in home waters.
The design team had put in place the test matrix
and was already well into the calibration work necessary to home in on the
optimum parameters for the bigger boat. Once again a lot was learned but this
time we had gone much further down the path.
We began functioning as a team and
felt confident we were headed for great things.
Reflecting
on the commercial proposition of the 34th AC, one cannot help but
notice that a radical transformation happened by degrees, in a way that was not
immediately apparent at each incremental step, but which added up to a format
very much at odds with the initial premise.
As things
stand, one cannot argue convincingly in favour of the commercial viability of
the format.
The balance of power has also shifted away from the interests of commercial
teams, in favour of large privately funded entities that effectively
hold the keys to the field of play.
In this framework, it is easy to imagine
that ‘some animals in the farm are more equal than others’.
It is tempting to
say ‘it was ever thus’, but this incarnation of the Cup has reached beyond the
reasonable expectation of politics, lobbying, intrigue and power-plays that are
part of AC folklore.
A confluence of years of play stopping litigation, the
economic times, a ‘non-establishment' vehicle, and, perhaps most significantly, a Challenger of Record that
was ‘friendly’to (and possibly dependent on) the Defender (and has in any case left the
picture), points to an interesting moral hazard in relation to the funding of
both the event and prospective teams.
The unprecedented combination of a
participating team also supplying (through entities that purport to being
independent but share a common funding source) the equipment, and having
mechanisms in place to unilaterally penalise other parties, makes for an
extremely uncertain situation for someone who is considering investing in order
to gain a return.
This point is worth pondering if it is really to sink in: the defender is supplying equipment to prospective challengers that can be admitted and sent off at will through thinly veiled rule pretexts.
I want to be clear that this is not a naïve idealistic realisation:
politics and dealmaking have always been a part of professional sport. But in
this case the picture is extremely unbalanced.
Instead of Challenger and Defender doggedly negotiating, each in the self-interest of securing the best chance to win, you had first a Challenger that was more interested in securing hosting rights than actually racing and winning. Then a puppet Challenger. And finally a Challenger relying on financial backing from the Defender.
As a small aside, let us remember that we are
talking about professional sport.
Professional does not mean ‘full time’. It means that the people involved do it
for a living. Meaning they get paid. In turn this should mean that those
providing the money should expect some value in return that is commensurate
with the investment. This requires arrangements to be dependable and transparent, with knowable costs that should be subordinate to the value being added.
In a commercial
reality where value for money is at a premium (since the need to spend on tax-deductible advertising is negated by slim or nonexistent margins), a bold
new proposition should offer as many certainties as possible to entice genuine
investment.
And there
is no question that the new AC format is bold and different if not new.
It
brings to the forefront the spectacle, excitement and technology that were once
hiding in a niche of our sport (namely the C Class and, to a lesser extent, the A class).
In my opinion this fulfills the spirit of
the AC as a pinnacle of international competition and a crucible for the
development of performance under sail.
Yet these premises are contradicted by
mandating a conservative one-manufacturer/one-design for a period much longer than the
anticipated ‘hit the ground running’ introductory bracket (leaving aside the dubious implications this revenue stream has on the fiduciary duties of the Trustee/Defender).
Along the way there
have been radical policy changes in the declared profit centres of the business
model, particularly with regard to TV and venues.
The calendar still has
gaping holes in it, and the eventual big race boat rule does not address the
original promise of containing costs where they do not lead to outright
performance or where they are absorbed by minute gains. Specifically, the AC72 rule started out admirably by restricting the key speed producing factors and imposing equipment limitations. But subsequent changes have driven up initial and ongoing / logistical costs beyond recognition whilst simultaneously the value available through exposure has dwindled.
Again, the AC has never been 'cheap', nor should it be.
The issue is not the size of the investment but the relationship between investment and return.
The
graphics and television coverage are remarkable and technically brilliant.
But, as
with any project lacking pre-defined benchmarking, it is impossible to judge
how much better the results could have been, or what would constitute an
unremarkable result or a failure.
The commercial considerations
that should come first and foremost if viability and sustainability are the
goal seem to be forgotten: the true measure should be efficiency - the value
for money to a stakeholder represented by what is being produced against the cost of producing it.
In this context I am surprised at the apparent willingness of commentators to
marvel about technical excellence without reference to the resources available.
Given enough money to hire enough talent, technical excellence should be
expected, not marveled at.
Technical achievements are of course admirable, but
they are even more so when they dwarf the available resources.
That is why TNZ
beating the Americans in 1995 on a shoestring budget and with wooden wings on the bulb
is more remarkable than America^3 winning in ’92 with a virtually unlimited
budget…
One would do well to examine the quality of the Extreme 40 coverage
that uses radio controlled UAV’s and other ideas that save money to increase
the value on the bottom line.
But one
must not dwell… The experience was fulfilling and worthwhile.
For sure similar
chances will arise again in better times.
Right now the lessons learned are
valuable and I intend to apply them to our other work whilst sharpening the
focus for 2012.